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POLITICAL SCIENCE

United States Foreign Policy:
An Appraisal of Globalism
WILLIAM

0.

PETERFI*

ABSTRACT - Many scholars and citizens agree that recent United States foreign policy has led
the country into global involvement, but there is wide disagreement as to the implications of
this. In this appraisal of the general concept of globalism the author hopes to show that, no
matter how the United States got involved in global politics, it can in a way be justified on the
basis of the national interest and that, although there is an urgent need for change in U.S.
foreign policy, it cannot now be done on a unilateral basis.

Perhaps no other single issue of contemporary American life has received greater exposure in the last decade
than the continuous discussion of United States foreign
policy. What was described not so long ago as a "political
desert" (Morgenthau, 1952: 4) has grown into a chain
of oases where almost endless debate is carried on by
travelers-scholars venturing into the once-barren sands
of American foreign policy. The discussion is indeed
the business of the entire nation today. There must be
some apparent causes for this sudden change in interest
among the people of the United States toward the making, execution, and subsequent interpretations of the nation's foreign policy.
Public expression about foreign policy often reaches
proportions of passionate self-torturing, to expiate real
or imagined guilt, and the extreme attitudes seem to
preclude dialogue between opposing opinions based upon
the basic principles of majority rule and the idea of
compromise.
Regardless of the reasons for attitudinal change, American foreign policy has become, unlike that of most other
nations, a peculiar combination of responsibilities to be
shared by the executive and legislative branches of government, assisted by the citizenry.
The main problem, it seems, is not the intense involvement by the people nor the extremist positions
which some assume, but the apparent chaos and anarchy
prevailing over the entire range of the foreign policy
debate.
The following analysis does not propose any new solutions but is rather an attempt to separate the major
issues from the minor ones which have contributed much
to the present state of confusion. William P. Gerberding,
in the preface of his text on the subject, states his main
reason for writing was to show "how to think, and not
what to think about foreign policy," (Gerberding, 1966:
ix). lt is my belief that most of the current confusion
* The author received degrees of Doctor of Law and Doctor
of Political Science from Budapest University in 1950. He was
a Post-Doctoral Research FelJow in International Politics at
Yale University in 1958-59, a Visiting Scholar in Politics at
U.C.L.A. in 1959-60, and a Visiting Fellow in Politics at Princeton University in I 960-61. Mr. Peterfi is now an associate professor at the University of Minnesota, Morris, and served as
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stems from the fallacious approach based on what people
think or should think about foreign policy. So this essay is concerned primarily with the questions of how to
think about United States foreign policy in general and
how to interpret American globalism in particular.
For practical purposes, the general scope of that policy
can be appraised on both horizontal and vertical planes.
The horizontal plane would encompass justification and
interpretations based on the purpose of U.S. foreign
policy, generally presuming a choice between the national interest or internationalism. On the vertical plane,
the basic issues would appear to revolve around the ways
and means of achieving that purpose through the application of isolationism or interventionism. Both of these
factors are overshadowed by the two almost mystical
phenomena of political morality and political realism, the
driving force and counterforce of the totality of this nation's foreign policy.
The Purpose: National Interest
or Internationalism

The relationship between foreign policy and national
interest is explicit; the former being the recognized and
accepted vehicle for the latter. Differences in interpretation center around the question of how successfully
U.S. foreign policy has served our national interest.
Since World War II, great disagreement has developed
on this issue. When the United States was still at the
threshold of that war, Thomas A. Bailey could say:
It seems clear that on the whole basic foreign
policies of the United States have served the nation
well, and that it would be unwise to cast them aside
for transient reasons, ( Bailey, 1940: 7 66) .
Then, in 1962, Hans J. Morgenthau, a defender of
national interest and at the same time a severe critic of
American foreign policy, wrote as follows:
While the international position of the United
States has (thus) suffered from the effects of uncontrollable circumstances, the foreign policies pursued
by the United States in recent years have not only
succeeded in counteracting these effects but actually
aggravated them. If one should characterize in one
sentence American foreign policy of recent years,
one would have to say that it has stood still while
the world has moved, ( Morgenthau, 1962: 68).
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Realists will argue that the best defense is to devise
foreign policies whose sole purpose is to protect the national interest. As Morgenthau remarked about American foreign policy: "Its purpose - its sole purpose ought to be . . . the security of the nation; security
against the greatest danger that ever threatened the
world" (Morgenthau, 1952: 88)
Internationalists who cannot accept the national interest as the purpose of U.S. foreign policy argue on the
basic assumption that the best way to protect the United
States is to put world interest above that of the nation. 1
They argue that an interdependence exists in the world
today, preventing one nation from going its own way
without regard to the rest of the world. As Thomas I.
Cook and Malcolm Moos pointed out:
American national interest must be re-defined as
its international interest, under which are compounded the particular and the universal, power and
ethics, the realism of idealism. For today security
and sharing are interdependent, and the freedom
and fulfillment of person, the central promise of industrial civilization, depends on both, (Cook and
Moos, 1953: 44).
One leading exponent of internationalism, Frank Tannenbaum, proposes to substitute for the concepts of national interest and power politics his so-called "co-ordinate state," based upon the equal sovereignty and dignity
of all states of the international community. Tannenbaum
proclaimed that the "co-ordinate state":
has everything to do with the recognition that compromise is a continuing means of nonviolent friction
(peace) . . . It is only if all the states continue to
have equal dignity among themselves that changes
in power and wealth can be absorbed without undue violence. This is the essence of federalism in
international relations. The co-ordinate state relationship makes it possible to accept the inevitable
growth of some and the decline of other states without war and without the loss of "face," because the
changes are gradual and absorbed through a process
of accommodation by all the members who are equal
to each other (Tannenbaum, 1952: 140).
In addition to Morgenthau another leading realist,
George F. Kennan,2 speaks in defense of the national
interest as the guiding principle of the American Republic and an inherent part of her foreign policy from
the beginning. As he put it, "the assurance of the national
1
Among leading internationalists since the end of World War
II, I count Frank Tannenbaum, lnis Claude, Grenville Clark,
and Louis B. Sohn. It may be submitted, however, that because
of our long tradition of interpreting foreign policy on the basis
of national interest, internationalists have not received as wide
recognition as could be expected on such an important issue.
Between these two views would be a middle-of-the-road position,
such as is taken by Arnold Wolfers and Senator J. William
Fulbright.
2
Kennan's position is somewhat unique. He recognizes the
necessity for protection of the national interest, but he also
comes out in favor of the judicious and limited internationalism
for its continuous protection.
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security and the promotion of private American activity
abroad were all that really did flow directly and logically
from the original objects of American society" (Kennan, 1954: 12).
Because of the debate, emphasis of the foreign policy
controversy has shifted from the primary topic, the purpose of the United States foreign policy, to the secondary
topic, the justification of the same purpose. In other
words, the paramount question is no longer whether the
United States has a right to protect its national interest
through foreign policy but how that national interest can
best be protected.
I believe Morgenthau touched upon the entire problem of secondary interpretations of the purpose of United
States national interest when he posed the question-argument of the idealists-utopians as leveled against his theory:
It has been frequently argued against the realist
conception of foreign policy that its key concept, the
national interest, does not provide an acceptable
standard for political action. This argument is in the
main based upon two grounds: the illusiveness of
the concept and its susceptibility to interpretations,
such as limitless imperialism and narrow nationalism which are not in keeping with the American
tradition in foreign policy (Morgenthau, "Another
Great Debate," 1952: 116).
The "American tradition" thus appears to be the
haunting, ever-present key issue in the general assessment of U.S. history. How does one correlate political
morality, an undeniable heritage, with political realism
or expediency in defining the national purpose? Can
the argument in favor of the national interest be justi,fied on moral grounds or can it even be justified on
grounds of political realism? This is the first major question followed by its antithesis : If the purpose of foreign
policy is exclusively the protection of the national selfinterest, will or will not this theory and position be selfdefeating insofar as the rigid and exclusive adherence to
the national interest of one country will evoke similar
reaction by other countries, thus leading to conflict and
war?
Between those two extremes a synthesis is needed. The
trap to these two questions is less than apparent : If the
realists are right, then to all appearances it does not
really matter whether the justification will be based on
political morality or political realism. On the other hand,
if the purpose of foreign policy is something else than
the national interest, then whether its justification is
based on political realism or political morality matters
greatly. The core of the arguments is basically the same,
but the two sides approach the issue from opposite ends.
This is the ancient problem of the so-called "double
standard" - each group attacking the other's theories in
order to justify the correctness of its position vis a vis
those views. Quoting Morgenthau again as he attacks
the zeal of the one-sided moralist:
(The crusader) projects the national moral standards into the international scene not only with the
135

legitimate claim of reflecting the national interest,
but with the politically and morally unfounded
claim of providing moral standards for all mankind.
Through the intermediary of the universal moral
appeal, the national and the universal interests become one and the same thing. What is good for the
crusading country is by definition good for all mankind; and if the rest of mankind refuses to accept
such claims to universal recognition, it must be converted with fire and sword (Morgenthau, 1952:
37).
Morgenthau has thus lashed out against sanctimonious
justification of American involvement in foreign countries for the alteged protection of other people, which in
reality was nothing less than the fostering of American
interests.
A Historical Point

Charles A. Beard, in his study of national interest,
made the point that it was not until the end of the nineteenth century that "the directors of foreign policy in the
United States spoke of themselves as bound by moral
obligation to embark upon projects for uplifting, civilizing or Christianizing other peoples beyond the confines of the country" (Beard, 1934: 358). The main
architect of this approach was President Woodrow Wilson. Beard's appraisal of the eight years of Wilsonian
administration was summed up in the following: "President Wilson's declaration of foreign policy was based on
assumptions of moral values as distinguished from national interest conceived in commercial terms" (Beard,
1934: 377). Or, as Wilson himself proclaimed: "Only
free peoples can hold their purposes and their honor
steady to a common end and prefer the interest of mankind to any interest of their own" (Beard, 1934: 377).
In Wilson, American internationalists at last had their
anointed leader. However, even those who opposed
Wilson and his policies would now utilize his ideas in
support of their positions on American foreign policy
and its general horizontal interpretations. Even Alfred
Thayer Mahan, a staunch supporter of American imperialism, invoked moral principles for the justification
of American national interests. So did Theodore Roosevelt, who in a curious way combined moral principles
and the "big stick" policy for the furthering of American power, as shown in his annual message to Congress
in 1906:
It is a mistake, and it betrays a spirit of foolish cynicism, to maintain that all international governmental action is, and must ever be, based upon mere
selfishness, and that to advance ethical reasons for
such action is always a sign of hypocrisy . . . A
really great nation must often act, and as a matter,
of fact of<ten does act, toward other nations in a
spirit not in the least of mere self-interest, but paying heed chiefly to ethical reasons . . . (Beard,
1934: 374).
This double standard of morality can best be interpreted with excerpts such as the words of Curtis D. Wilbur, Secretary of the Navy under President Coolidge. In
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a speech to the Connecticut Chamber of Commerce he
said:
To defend America we must be prepared to defend
its interests and our flag in every comer of the
globe . . . World-wide interests require world-wide
defense. An American child crying on the banks of
the Y angtse a thousand miles · from the coast can
summon the ships of the American Navy up that river
to defend it from unj,ust assault. Any nation facing
the sea can be called to account by our navy . . .
(New York Times, May 8, 1928).
At the end of World War II, Abe Fortas, then Undersecretary of the Interior and presently an associate justice of the Supreme Court, told New York City College
alumni: "We are the one nation in the world that can
successfully assert the moral leadership necessary to
guide the world to peace and civilized living" (New York
Times, Nov. 18, 1945; Beard, 1946: 23).
Statements like the above seem to have formed the
basis of justifications for our foreign policy for exponents and practitioners Acheson, Dulles, Finletter and
others up to Dean Rusk. Yet those who in an increasing number have become critical of this "double standard" interpretation and justification of United States foreign policy are reminded of the warning by Secretary of
State Hughes, who in an address at Amherst College on
June 18, 1924, condemned "writers who apparently make
it their business to develop antagonism and to spread
among the people of this country, who have no opportunities for judgment from personal knowledge, the notion that our policies are imperialistic, that our influence
is baleful, and that mutual respect and friendship are decreasing" (Moon, 1926: 407-8).
It took some forty years before the American public
was ready to question the validity of Hughes' thinking,
and was willing to listen to, if not agree with, politicallyprominent critics of American foreign policy who deplored the "arrogance of American power." Senator J.
William Fulbright of Arkansas, who did much to unleash the current tide of critical analysis of U.S. foreign policy, stated that "gradually but unmistakably
America is showing signs of that arrogance of power
which has afflicted, weakened and in some cases destroyed great nations in the past" (Fulbright, 1966: 22).
Morgenthau argued the point another way when he refuted the "double standards" of those who tried to justify United States policies on the basis of so-called
"moral principles" (Morgenthau, 1952: 93).
In conclusion, I maintain that the obvious reason for
confusion regarding questions involving the national interest and internationalism on the horizontal level of
American foreign policy is tied primarily to what people
think about American foreign policy. Steps for clarification are being attemped by those who introduce new approaches to how to think about it.
The Ways and Means:
Isolationism or Interventionism

Basically, isolationism may be defined as the complete
self-reliance of a nation in its domestic and foreign at-
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fairs, while interventionism may be considered the premeditated and willful interference by one nation into the
domestic and foreign affairs of another. Indiscriminate
usage by many scholars of terms considered synonymou'>
with isolationism and interventionism, such as non-intervention, anti-imperialism, etc., has contributed to confusion in defining the two basic concepts.
It is said that the historical origin of American isolationism goes back to Washington's Farewell Address
of 1796. Since then there has developed a separate literature dealing with various interpretations of American
isolationism mainly from the point of view of the particular interpreter himself. It has, however, been argued
that only a few scholars have dealt correctly with the
Farewell Address in a historical context, as it ought to
be. Selig Adler formulated a cogent question when h::
asked: "Was Washington speaking to his contemporaries or to generations yet unborn?" and went on to answer it by stating: "No matter how one answers this debatable question, it is safe to say that the Father of our
Country made neutrality and non-intervention a national
fixation" (Adler, 1957: 16).
Washington did not speak explicitly of isolationism or
non-intervention or neutrality, he merely warned Americans to stay away from "entangling alliances." But the
interpreter-scholar went to work, and the result was a
new confusion in the interpretation of the vertical level
of American foreign policy, the ways and means of its
implementation. Despite the many interpretations, it can
be stated with some justification that American political
history had its two major periods of isolationism and interventionism. For practical purposes, I would suggest
that from its beginning until about the end of World
War II, the U.S. adhered basically to a foreign policy of
isolationism. Since World War II, however, this country's foreign policy can be described as interventionism
with some flings at non-intervention and anti-imperialism.
A few examples are pertinent for illustrative purposes.
The proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine was a combination of interventionism and imperialism in a positive
way, from the point of view of the United States, and
non-interventionism from the point of view of European
involvement vis a vis the United States. Definite imperialism was shown during the Mexican and Spanish wars.
Neutralism was exemplified in the period of the European
Napoleonic wars and the two periods before the entry
of the United States into World Wars I and II, respectively. Interventionism, in its pure form, has been demonstrated by American meddling into the international
affairs of the Caribbean republics. Pacifism was evidenced in American mediation between Imperial Russia
and Japan, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and the Washington
Naval Treaty. All these movements of U.S. diplomacy
were in accordance with the national interest, and were
interpreted invariably on the basis of political realism or
political morality.
Second Phase of Policy
The second phase of our foreign policy, following
World War II, brought forward interventionism with
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intermittent bits of imperialism, non-interventionism, and
anti-imperialism. Since 1945, there has not been a major
conflict in which the United States was not directly or
indirectly involved. American armed forces were involved
in World War II from 1941 to 1945 for a total of five
years. Direct military involvement from 1945 to 1968
totals nine years : three years in Korea and six years in
Vietnam as of this writing. This does not include permanent military missions such as the stationing of American forces in Japan and Germany, nor the short-term
appearances in Lebanon and the Dominican Republic.
All these involvements of the United States were the direct result of American foreign policy and should be described as interventionism, in the strict interpretation of
the term.
The number of indirect interventions by the United
States is large, although difficult to determine, and might
vary according to justifications given. One could, for example, consider American involvements in China and
Cuba as indirect interventionism because American
forces were not used in these conflicts in a direct way.
American pressure upon Great Britain, France and Israel in 1956 is another example, as are the Greek civil
war (1946); the Italian national election (194 7) ; the
Berlin blockade; Guatemala (1954); the Congo affair
( 1961); and the Rhodesian involvement ( 1965) . On the
other hand, clear-cut cases of American imperialism since
the end of World War II are the acceptance through the
United Nations trusteeship over Japanese islands in the
Pacific (l 94 7) and the establishment of a global system
of military alliances since 1949. There have been cases
of American non-interventionist policies also, such as the
Kashmir dispute; the East Berlin rising ( 1953); the Poznan riots (1956); the Hungarian revolution (1956); and
the Indonesian civil war ( 1965). Finally, American antiimperialism had as its shining example the granting of
independence to the Philippines in 1946; and American
support through the United Nations for liquidation of
remaining colonial empires is well known.
All the situations discussed above can be justified both
on the basis of the United States national interest and on
that of internationalism as the purpose of U .S. foreign
policy. For example, the take-over of the former Japanese islands was justified on the basis of political realism,
although to the political moralist the action was objectionable as a sign of resurgent American imperialism.
The political realists could justify American non-involvement in the Hungarian Revolution on the basis that abstention served the national interest better at that time,
yet the political moralists deplored non-intervention as
a betrayal of high moral principles of the United States.a
• An illustration of the impasse between the political moralist
and the political realist on the different justifications for a given
U.S. policy is expressed by Dean Acheson in his paper, "The
Premises of American Foreign Policy." He argues that American problems could not be solved on the basis of "formal moralistic rules," but if we approached our problem from the point
of view of solving it, then these considerations are not important. It is not that we consider the French , the Germans, or
the British more desirable people than the Indians, the Burmese,
or the Vietnamese, but that, at the time, the center of power in
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While these examples demonstrate the complexity of
the overall analysis and appraisal of American foreign
policy in the context of isolationism versus interventionism, I must conclude that more often than not it has
been necessity which dictated the selection of one policy
over the other, and that all actions were taken for the
stated purpose of protecting national interest, whether
consciously or unconsciously.
Reality or Guilt by Association:
American "Global,ism"

Even the most ardent apologists for recent American
foreign policy would not deny that the United States is
today involved on the global scale in international affairs. However, what must be investigated is whether
U.S. foreign policy is responsible by design or by default
for her present global involvement in wodd affairs. The
next question, then, would be whether it has served the
best interest of the United States and the world or has
led to a much greater confrontation between the two
super-powers. And the final question is what course
American foreign policy should take into the ] 970's to
remedy this situation.
According to authors Stillman and Pfaff, globalism is:
the general conviction that the affairs of the world
today are to be understood in terms of a universal
conflict in values - between freedom and unfreedom, reason and force, orderly progress and despotism. It is the belief that the United States, as the
leading proponent of a system of free government,
is obligated to use its power (its material power,
but also its power of moral suasion and leadership)
to dominate this worldwide conflict. The United
States is held to be compelled to do this for its own
security . . . but also in the general interests of
mankind, (Stillman and Pfaff, 1967: 8).

It was eventually the Wilson era which forced these principles to make the world "safe for democracy." The postwar disillusionment and sobering-up of the nation led to
a temporary introverted self-gratification about the "ungratefulness" of the uncivilized world so recently saved
from Teutonic domination. As a result, the U.S. indulged
in a period of isolationism to prove that Americans could
have a wonderful life of their own, whereas the other
countries could not prosper without American leadership.
The signs of ideological globalism in foreign policy
and a general feeling and intoxication of power has been
expressed in a text by Randolph Greenfield Adams, who
wrote:
Perhaps no country has risen to greatness in the
family of nations with so little conscious attention
to her foreign policy (Adams, 1924: 1).

Then he added a word of caution, proclaiming: "The
day is past, however, when the people of the United
States can afford to disregard their foreign policy."
What had been a more or less forgiveable juvenile
boastfulness about American power showed itself in fullest manhood and responsibility during World War II.
Americans nevertheless became puzzled by the international situation after the war when it was apparent that
America had become the leader of the world, and her
mere physical power demanded a seemingly permanent
and unwavering leadership stance. As co-authors Herbert
J. Spiro and Benjamin Barber remarked: "Until World
War II America's foreign policy had succeeded without
really trying; after the war no amount of trying seemed
to bring success" (Spiro and Barber, 1967: 5).
Three Postwar Principles

Actually, U.S. globalism and its moral, ideological,
and philosophical justification began long before World
War II. Beginnings are to be found in the Monroe Doctrine, a unilateral act for the protection of U.S. interest,
which then was to stay out of conflict with major European colonial powers and seek free expansion in the
Western Hemisphere. Between 1823 and 189 8, the rise
of the United States to a world power status and the
sense of a special mission for the world began to take
form. It was this mission which eventually became a
kind of second nature and found its expression in subsequent U.S. foreign policy. 4
Americans not only believed in the above statements
about themselves, but began to feel the rest of the world
should think about America along similar lines. There
was at last a real justification for American domestic and
foreign policies derived from these appealing principles.

The three announced principles of American foreign
policy since the end of World War II have been: (1)
fighting Communism, (2) protecting the national interest, and ( 3) working toward peace, in that order.
I am inclined to believe that while the aims might not
be questionable, the order of preference is highly debatable. The order perhaps jeopardizes the national interest, for it is overshadowed by the insistence of combating Communism, which in turn mars the proclaimed
efforts toward peace."
It has been argued that American obsession with Communism has altered the entire scope of our foreign policy.
Since adoption of the policy of containment in 194 7, as
the best way to protect U.S. interests, all administrations
have used it. Whether the United States has sought in a
conscious manner the leadership of the world is, if not
a question of great importance, one of integrity, and
should be answered in the negative. It is a historical fact
that after World War II nobody could challenge American power. Had the United States harbored sinister de-

the non-Communist world is in North America and Western
Europe (Acheson in Hahn and Neff, 1960:412-413).
·• Advocates of the "mission for America" idea were to be
found in almost all walks of life, ranging from practical politicians (Senators Albert J. Beveridge and Henry Cabot Lodge) to
publicist-scholars (John Fiske and John W. Burgess) to military
experts (Alfred Thayer Mahan) and even clergymen (Josiah
Strong).

" George F. Kennan has recognized the immensity of the problem and also has outlined alternatives and their implications.
He, indeed, made a presentation of the issues from the point of
view of how to think about American-Soviet relations instead of
what to think about them, and clearly realized that American
relations to world Communism present "a crisis of opinions of
such seriousness as to constitute of itself a great and present
danger."
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signs for world domination, nobody could have stopped
her from realizing that goal.
Addressing himself to the current U.S. involvement in
Southeast Asia, Senator Fulbright, a leading critic of our
contemporary foreign policy, stated:
It is ironic that at the same time that the vestiges
of the Monroe Doctrine are being fitfully liquidated,
the United States should be formulating a similar
doctrine of pre-eminent American responsibility for
Asia. One wonders whether the "Asian Doctrine"
will reap for the United States as rich a harvest of
affection and democracy as has the Monroe Doctrine (Fulbright, 1966: 111).
It would appear that all who profess concern about the
future of the United States agree that protection of the
national interest is paramount, but disagree on ways and
means of achieving it. It would appear, also, that at least
under the present international conditions, internationalism is clearly not the justification for American involvement on a global scale. Even Morgenthau, defender of
the national interest doctrine, feels that policy-makers of
the United States may be endangering the national interest by adopting an overly-rigid foreign policy against
international Communism. What seems necessary is a
new, deliberate and flexible approach which is not necessarily one of withdrawal from world involvement, as Fulbright and others advocate, but a policy of imagination
and instant responsiveness to the challenge of Communism.
The current line of policy may not only endanger the
long range national interest of the United States but also
that of the whole world. In order to contain Communism,
the United States had adopted a policy of the status quo,
so aptly analyzed by Morgenthau:
Our foreign policy since the end of the two world
wars has had the over-all objective to prevent a
change in the territorial status quo. The rationale
for this policy is sound . . .
We, however, are committed to the defense of the
status quo pure and simple, that is, of any status
quo regardless of its defensibility (Morgenthau,
1962: 69).

To conclude my investigation of American globalism,
the following general observations are in order. The
United States is involved on a global scale in contemporary world affairs, and it has not sought this role.
Since, on the other hand, the Soviet Union also emerged
as an international power after World War II, a confrontation on a global scale became unavoidable. The future
of the United States was placed in jeopardy. This
prompted the United States to reappraise its position in
the world and accept the Soviet challenge by becoming
the leader of the non-Communist world. Thus the question of the conscious or guilt-by-association complex of
American contemporary global involvement can be decided in favor of an involuntary act on the part of the
United States. In this respect, the feeling of guilt amounts
to nothing less than the feeling of frustration among
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Americans that this Communist challenge has not yet
been terminated successfully.
The development of the so-called bi-polar world cannot be said to have served the best interest of the United
States, nor of the world in general, because of the everpresent danger of nuclear war between the two superpowers. The energies of the United States have thus had
to be devoted to that single problem, leaving little interest in continuous peace on a global scale.
Regarding new approaches to end the present impasse
for solution of the Soviet challenge, I would agree with
both Fulbright and Morgenthau that a reassessment of
American foreign policy and its objectives is necessary.
From the post-World War II developments on the international scene, it should be obvious that even the
super-powers can no longer conduct their foreign affairs
without due regard to the objectives and interests of
other nations, 1arge or small. Any foreign policy decisions
will have worldwide implications today. The objectives
and the means of achieving them are in direct relation to
expected success or failure. This is what Charles Burton
Marshal called the "limits of foreign policy": "A sound
general understanding of the limits of foreign policy,
avoiding excessive expectations, is therefore essential to
the conduct of a sound foreign policy." (Marshall, 1954:
13).
Possible Goals and Risks

It is on the basis of the recognition of the limits of
foreign policy that a reappraisal ~f United States foreign
policy should follow. The basic objectives of national
survival should not be easily jeopardized because of some
goals which cannot be realized without possible incalculable risks which do not even appear to be essential
for survival. I am obviously referring here to the American obsession with almost every aspect of Communism.
In my opinion, one positive step toward re-assessment
of American foreign policy should definitely be a change
in the order of preference of the three previously-mentioned underlying principles. The United States should
concentrate more on the establishment of a peaceful
world on a global plane; it should de-emphasize its rigid
policy toward Communism and, through following the
revised preference, should also be more capable of protecting its own national interest.
As noted before, once the goals have been clearly defined and the ways and means of working to achieve
them agreed upon, the solutions can be sought. In the
process, however, a continuous reappraisal and evaluation of the goals and their relationship to possible results
should be weighed in order to reduce the risk of failure.
As Marshall pointed out:

The goal aspect of foreign policy is essential. It is
also the easiest part of the business. The difficult
part comes not in figuring out what one would do
if one could do everything one may wish to do . . .
It comes in deciding what to do in the circumstances of being able to do only part of what one
may wish to do. Here the making of foreign policy
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reaches the vital level. Here success is courted. Here
failure is risked. (Marshall, 1954: 30-31).
Obviously, the United States cannot make any basic
concessions on a unilateral basis, because this would imperil its national interest. There must be found a happy
medium between the two possible extremes: unlimited
pursuit of the national interest on the one hand, and unilateral concession on the other. It is on this basis that I
conclude that the urgent need for a reappraisal of American contemporary foreign policy, however essential,
must proceed in the view of its overall global implications. If, as appears to be the case at present, a compromise solution cannot be attempted nor achieved between
the United States and the Soviet Union, then the United
States, while continuously inviting and carrying on a
dialogue for this purpose, must keep its guard and avoid
making unilateral concessions.
Finally, no matter what course American foreign policy may take in the near future, it would be presumptuous at this point to apologize for or condemn it before
it has its "day in court."
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